Law Text Culture
Volume 22 The Trace, The Document, The Archive:
Encounters Between Legal Grammatology and Digital
Technology
2018

Is Technology for the Anthropocene an
Impossibility? A Conversation about the Myko
Project
Mark Antaki
McGill University

Richard Janda
McGill University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc
Recommended Citation
Antaki, Mark and Janda, Richard, Is Technology for the Anthropocene an Impossibility? A
Conversation about the Myko Project, Law Text Culture, 22, 2018, 91-115.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol22/iss1/8
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Article 8

Is Technology for the Anthropocene an Impossibility? A Conversation
about the Myko Project
Abstract

We, the two interlocutors in this discussion, Mark Antaki and Richard Janda, have for the past number of years
had periodic exchanges about the theoretical underpinnings and possible critique of a project that Janda has
been leading, which seeks to signal to individuals the impacts of their choices upon collective environmental,
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number of paradoxes and challenges for legal normativity involved in using new forms of technology to
address the accumulating and devastating externalities produced by our use of technology. A mutual
fascination with the project and its critique led us to conclude that the discussion might have some broader
saliency. This dialogue allowed us to share our preoccupations concerning the pervasive quality of technology
in our lives and to explore how our efforts to redress the dominion of technology over nature might cede to
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Is Technology for the Anthropocene
an Impossibility? A Conversation
about the Myko Project
Mark Antaki1 and Richard Janda2
We, the two interlocutors in this discussion, Mark Antaki and Richard
Janda, have for the past number of years had periodic exchanges about the
theoretical underpinnings and possible critique of a project that Janda has
been leading, which seeks to signal to individuals the impacts of their choices
upon collective environmental, health and social goods and to orient these
individuals to make better choices. Antaki has sought to probe a number of
paradoxes and challenges for legal normativity involved in using new forms
of technology to address the accumulating and devastating externalities
produced by our use of technology. A mutual fascination with the project and
its critique led us to conclude that the discussion might have some broader
saliency. This dialogue allowed us to share our preoccupations concerning the
pervasive quality of technology in our lives and to explore how our efforts to
redress the dominion of technology over nature might cede to the temptation
to call upon new forms of technology in aid. Is this temptation to be resisted?

M: Richard, your project has led to the development of an app for
a cell phone. As I understand it, the app is supposed to help people
become aware of their patterns of consumption, even their modes of
life, and help them to become more responsible for their choices. Could
you explain how the app grows out of your concerns about climate
change and the Anthropocene, and in particular how a law professor
got involved in such a project?
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R: I had an experience in 2009 that felt as if the scales had fallen
off my eyes. It was at the failed Copenhagen Summit that sealed
the fate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. As a jurist, I had come to imagine that a global treaty was the
necessary pinnacle of achievement for the coordination of social norms
to mitigate our impacts on the biosphere. The logic seemed compelling.
Since each of us affects all of us in participating in an economy that
generates unsustainable greenhouse gas emissions, only a collective
framework governing all emissions could succeed in confronting the
crisis. There had after all been a precedent. The Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer adopted in 1987 succeeded
in curbing the use of these substances and in shrinking what came
to be known as the ‘hole in the ozone layer’ (Strahan and Douglass
2018). But at Copenhagen in 2009, it became obvious that the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would
not succeed despite the thousands of climate justice protesters and
pious expressions of concern from world leaders. The atmosphere was
grim from the very outset when the lead negotiator for the Obama
administration, Todd Stern, stated, ‘I actually completely reject the
notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the like. For most of
the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, people were blissfully
ignorant of the fact that emissions caused a greenhouse effect. It’s a
relatively recent phenomenon’ (New York Times December 9 2012). This
meant in practice that there would be no way to align the position of
‘developing countries’ with that of the industrialised world toward a
common emissions trading framework. Sure enough, the 2009 process
collapsed and all that could ultimately be salvaged from it was the
hollow Paris Agreement of 2015, which has itself now unravelled.
For me, this was a dramatic failure of law. True, the politicians had
allowed that legal instrument to whither and die. But the very idea of
proceeding by way of a formal legal framework was itself left in tatters.
What had been perhaps the most elaborate effort of all time to generate
world-wide treaty-making capacity to address an existential challenge
for the entire world’s population had led to a dead end. So, I had to ask
myself if there was another way to generate the requisite transformation
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of social norms. If the transformation of the social and economic norms
could not be achieved through a formal agreement of states binding all
from the top down, might it be achieved through informal means? You
know well my pedigree of work with Rod Macdonald on legal pluralism
and informal normativity (Janda, Jukier and Jutras 2015). I had already
come to believe that there was too much faith being placed in a kind
of legal formalism and abstract positivism. So, I began searching for
ways in which legal norms could be fashioned collectively without the
apparatus of state treaties.
The work of Elinor Ostrom also served as a fascinating invitation to
imagine how to favour the stewardship of collective goods. Although
her Nobel Prize was in economics, much of her work paid attention to
modes of informal governance and social signalling in the management
of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). If the problem we are facing,
the very destruction of the biosphere, is the most significant tragedy of
the commons ever produced, then decentralised, polycentric solutions
like those explored by Ostrom would have to be deployed on a global
scale.

M: Hearing you speak confirms my sense that your project involves
a set of fascinating encounters with normativity. The research seems
to come out of a sense of urgency in the face of a predicament that
affects all humans. I cannot help but think of Hannah Arendt’s idea
of a ‘negative solidarity’ of humanity forged by technology and tied to
humanity’s capacity to destroy itself. In some sense, you wish to bring
‘political responsibility’ (Arendt 1968: 83) to this negative solidarity.

The inadequacy of (international) law – or of (international) law
traditionally understood – to meet contemporary challenges is also a
kind of Arendtian theme. I understand some of your past remarks as
suggesting that the inadequacy of law you refer to is in part a version
of the difficulties attendant to translating or transcribing the laws of
nature into positive law – difficulties attendant to aligning fusis and
nomos (Kelley 1990), or should we say, fusis and tekne? It’s as if you’ve
come to the conclusion that positive law traditionally understood cannot
translate the laws of nature, in other words, the laws of the earth. If
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human law is to align itself with the laws of nature, if a social contract
is to be ‘naturalised’ or transformed into or supplemented by a ‘natural
contract’ (Serres 1995), you seem to suggest that we need to turn to a
different kind of legal or social normativity. In order to make possible
this alignment, I see you turn in the direction of, among other things,
‘nudging,’ and behavioural economics.

One of the interesting things about your project, to put it too
simplistically and reductively, is its use of ‘a’ technology – the cell
phone – to answer a challenge unleashed by technology or, perhaps
to be more precise, ‘technique’ (Heidegger 1977: 3)…. I wonder about
how the very thing you are turning to – the cell phone – could itself
instantiate a great failure of human beings with regard to the earth.
We’ve already spoken about how the cell phone is one of the least
circular products out there, given its use of rare earth metals. We can
also add to this the kind of critiques of the cell phone that confront
it as an ‘absolute device’ (Ferraris 2014a: 59) itself invested in, so to
speak, the transformations of beings, including human beings, into
‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger 1977: 18). Both the Anthropocene and
the cell phone seem to point to a kind of ‘total mobilisation’ that may
‘reveal human nature to itself ’ (Ferraris 2014b: 205). Your project raises
the question of how they do so or could do so together.

R: Certainly, one can ask why we would do the crazy thing of
relying upon the very mechanisms that disconnect us from the material
conditions of our lives in order to produce some sort of collective action
in response to these changes in material conditions. I’ll share my state
of mind and maybe I’m now on a path dependency of my own in giving
this kind of answer. I think that what is ‘de-materialising’ us is what
we have to pay attention to if we are to realign collective behaviour.
If we could learn how to ‘nudge’ – to use the behavioural economics
term – the representations of ourselves, those virtual creations in this
world of social media, would we be able, in a sense, to amplify the shift
in behaviour that is needed in the material world? To be more specific,
if people are now actually oriented towards what their choices mean
for Facebook and Instagram and Twitter identities and want to be
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able to represent themselves successfully on such networks, can they
be mobilised to improve social choices? If enough of them really care
to be seen as ‘virtuous’ as regards collective impacts, can that in turn
help to amplify their willingness to change settled habits involving
patterns of consumption?

M: It sounds like one of the things we’ve been doing in our
conversation is dancing around a distinction such as the one between
reality and ‘social reality’ (Ferraris 2014a: 3). At first glance, the
Anthropocene – which we have not quite spoken about directly so
far – is not ‘social reality’ but ‘material reality’. How does it become
social reality? How does the normativity, the laws of nature, of the
earth, that govern the Anthropocene become part of, tractable in, the
laws of Facebook or social networks? It seems like part of what you are
doing, what you are interested in, which I don’t necessarily see in the
phenomenological or media-technological takes on the cell phone, is
not just that the cell phone transforms or reveals normativity …. Yes,
that is all nice and good. But that is not the whole of our predicament.
We need to translate ‘the natural’ into ‘the social’. The traces or archives
that interest us are not just those tied to the cell phone but the traces
or the archives of the earth, on the earth ….

R: That is a profound observation. The term ‘Anthropocene’ has
to do with traces on the earth. It’s a hypothesis that geologists are
apparently in the midst of debating, although they are in no great rush
to resolve the matter because they are operating in geological time! The
notion is that our trace upon the earth is such that we can characterise
the sedimentary deposit of Anthropos as sufficient to characterise a new
geological era. Examples of the Anthropocene from a geologist’s point
of view would be the bizarre rock forms that are now incorporating
plastic or the fact that you can take soil samples anywhere on the planet
now and find some traces of human activity. So, in fact, you are right,
there is significant evidence of the ubiquitous material presence of
human activity in the geological record. From another point of view
though, as you put it, there is a need to take this material reality and
turn it into a social reality. The problem could be turned upside down.
From the vantage point of the geological record, the human trace is
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an infinitesimal sort of surface trace and as quickly as it arises could
be overwhelmed by what would replace it. Books have been written
that project forward what the geological record will look like once
we disappear, so as to predict what would quickly be re-absorbed
and what would not (Weisman 2007). There’s actually not that much
that would be left for very long. Why am I saying that? The current
material reality is only of significance as a representation back to us
of a certain social outcome, namely ‘the world without us’, to borrow
Weisman’s title. The Anthropocene is only a relevant phenomenon
to the extent that we care about whether a continued human trace is
something to be sought. If that were not of significance, we would just
observe a 2oC temperature increase ushering in runaway climate change
corresponding to a mass extinction. We would also observe that this
extinction would ultimately include the disappearance of a particular
species that was responsible for the phenomenon. Whatever would then
substitute for that particular bio-geo-climatic condition would simply
arise. As we departed from it, the geological record would reveal itself
as utterly immune to any normative orientation as regards us; unless
the removal of our continuing trace upon the geological record is our
moral recompense!
M: The very name of your app brings together, combines, both the
archiving, inscribing of or on the earth and the connectivity actualised
and symbolised by the cell phone. Can you tell us more about why your
app is called ‘Myko’?

R: Well, it’s the Greek root for the family of organisms of the fungi
kingdom, including yeasts, mushrooms and lichen. There were two
reasons we chose that name. The first was that in nature, these plants
are actually strong bio indicators. They register environmental impacts
with exquisite sensitivity. Thus, if you go to the Île Sainte-Hélène and
Île Notre-Dame in Montreal before and after the Grand Prix, one of
the ways of telling that it took place is to look at the lichen because
they degrade very quickly in response to the changing air conditions.
So, these organisms can respond more acutely than technical
instruments to changing environmental impacts. But the other reason
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for the name is something called the mycorrhizal network, formed of
fungal filaments existing in symbiosis with the roots of plants. This is
what some people call, using totally upside down logic, ‘the internet
of trees.’ You have probably seen that if you dig up the roots of trees
that they have a kind of white fibrous material, the mycorrhizae. A
representation of this phenomenon is in the film Avatar, strangely
enough, since we’re talking about avatars in virtual reality. The entire
planet Pandora seems to be connected to the Tree of Souls. That was
a mythical extension of the mycorrhizal network.
M: So, you don’t really have the word ‘Anthropocene’ in the name of
the app … but you have the bio-indication possibility of these organisms
and their strong connectivity.

R: We wanted to underscore the notion of signaling and connectivity
in the Anthropocene. In a forest, what the mycorrhizal network does is
allow a parent tree to send nutrients to a sapling. So, it involves a mode
of communication among these plants. We wanted to convey the idea
that we were learning to communicate organically about the impacts
that we’re having on the planet. It was actually the student researchers
who chose the name. One of our researchers proposed it, the students
conducted a focus group exercise and this was the proposed name that
had the most appeal.

M: As I understand it, your app makes use of different kinds of
logic that lead us to think of normativity in different ways. Drawing
on our previous conversations, I think I can name several. One logic
is a logic of real-time signaling (and perhaps gathering) of information
made possible by the cell phone and connectivity. This enables a kind
of collective and individual representation of a sustainability footprint.
This awareness of human beings, of their footprint, however, may not
be sufficient to ‘move’ human beings to action. A second logic, then,
is that of ‘nudging,’ of finding ways to move people that do not involve
explicit command or direction, that perhaps do not speak to ‘practical
reason’ or to the ‘will’ as ‘rules’ do. A third logic is tied to social media,
what I’ve called, perhaps inappropriately, a thumodic logic.3 This is a
logic of competition, of comparing oneself with others, of the desire
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for ‘recognition.’ A fourth logic is tied to the video game and involves
the building of a ‘world’ with different layers or ‘levels’ to be traversed
or uncovered. ... Perhaps you can tell us about the different versions
of Myko and the way in which each of these harnesses - or not - the
different logics or normativities?

R: The first version was just set up to show you a score for a given
action. It operated like a ‘quantified self ’ tool that people use and
follow, for example to know how many steps they’ve taken, or how
many calories they’ve eaten or what heartbeat they are registering. It
would just follow your behaviours, for example with respect to modes
of transportation, and you entered them and you got a score, based on
the life cycle analysis of the impacts of the behaviour, just by swiping
the action that you’d taken from a list you set up. We had a leader board
and so you could see where you ranked in comparison with others. It
was a very real metrification of the score.
M: So … users entered their own data. And there was a kind of
competition or thumodic element, of seeing and being seen, of seeking
distinction.

R: Yes. We decided in the second version - which is in hibernation
- to move away from that sort of purely metrified approach and make it
more of a visual representation where you were taking care of yourself
and taking care of your planet. We did it in a very, very simple way.
We were playing on the idea of the old Tamagotchi digital pets.
Children were really into them in the 1990s and they had to feed their
virtual animals and pay attention to them for their animals to grow
or indeed their digital pets could die. In our version of this idea, as
people improved on their impacts in different domains - food, waste,
energy and so on - trees would grow in their world corresponding to
improving impacts; their world would become more lush with more
sustainable behaviour. If you did something positive so many times, it
would qualify you for a harder positive action ... and the branches of
the trees would open up. As regards food, for example, if you gave up
meat once a week, that would grow a branch on the food tree with a
new leaf on it. You could open up other possibilities and eventually you
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could become vegan. So, the platform was meant to incline you towards
improving your impacts and growing your trees. And, to adopt a new
behaviour involved learning something about the impacts of foregone
behaviour and answering questions on quizzes.

M: So, the first version involved a kind of social media, thumodic
logic and the second version led to some gamification, not in the sense
of more competition or quest for recognition but in the sense of worldbuilding, of virtual worlds? And the data was still gathered in the same
way between the two versions? Can you tell me more about the move
from the first to the second, about how you discovered ‘gamification’?

R: We wanted to see what worked, and it was possible that different
kinds of choice architectures, to use the behavioural economics term,
would nudge differently. The reason the second one was called gamified
was actually fairly technical. We built it with someone who had worked
at Ubisoft and he looked at what we had in the first version and said,
‘Oh, you’ve got individual scores and I know about game architecture,
which requires that you move from level to level and that you have the
ability to unlock new choices and outcomes.’ We didn’t want it to be
a game like a video game, but we did want people to have the feeling
that they were moving in a positive direction and were engaged by the
experience. We wanted to go beyond the passive experience of the first
version in which you would make your own checklist of things you
wanted to do, say walk to work three times this week, and then when
you did them you’d swipe right you would get points each time you
fulfilled your own targets.
M: So, if I get it right, the first one is a multi-use tool. You can use
it to set a range of different sustainability goals. The second one gives
you more like an online persona with a narrative arc with a character
who moves through a world: that’s the gamification.
R: We didn’t go far with the persona idea. However, we thought
that we had made the first version of the Myko world and we imagined
that it could become more and more like what you describe, depending
upon how it appealed to people.
M: That’s where perhaps there are different kinds of ‘addictive
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possibilities’ to turn people onto environmentalism or what have you.

R: Yes, but we built it in a very sober stripped down way. We didn’t
want it to feel cartoonish to people. Thus, for example the branches
and leaves of the tree were very suggestive and abstract rather than a
formal depiction of a tree.
M: I see. So, we’ve talked a little bit about what I’ve called a
thumodic logic as well as a little about gamification. Both of these
involve moving people in specific ways. We have not really spoken
about ‘nudging,’ however. Was there nudging in the app itself?

R: Well there weren’t formal nudges or incentives built-in like
having free tickets for public transit, but we planned to have trees
planted for people who completed trees in the app and explored that
in some detail. I observe that a system like this is widely used in China
today. But our form of nudging was mainly the score itself and the desire
to open up new branches. We sought to help people to get to the point
that they would form new habits. However, we always sought to engage
them in making those choices for themselves. The architecture of the
app was designed to make it possible to incorporate further nudges
and incentives that would help users to improve their own footprint.
M: And you have a third version?

R: Yes, we had 1.0, the metric tool, and 2.0, the virtual world, and
now we are working on 3.0. The main problem we discovered with the
second version was that people got bored with it eventually. At first
it had a certain appeal, but then it wore off. Our initial reaction was
that we had not made it addictive enough. But for some of the reasons
you’ve invoked, I was not very attracted to that way of thinking. So,
in a sense we went back to the original experiment and we said to
ourselves that the problem is that we still hadn’t succeeded in making
this immediate or automatic. Each of the first two versions required
people themselves to use the tool to enter what they had done so as to
be able to get information back for themselves.
M: It seems to me that requiring users to enter their own data keeps
the app at a certain distance from the users while still granting them
a certain level of control, for example over which goals they wish to
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achieve. This, one might say, makes the app more of a tool and a much
less effective ‘prosthetic’ ... thus limiting the possibilities of what you
have called ‘real-time’ law or normativity. On the other hand, if users
do not need to enter their data themselves, the app might be closer to
being a full-fledged prosthetic or ‘conscience’ app, providing a more
immediate translation of the laws of the earth into human normativity.
Of course, this kind of ‘conscience prosthetic’ and the way data entry
might work raise all kinds of dystopian scenarios.

R: Yes. There’s a huge dystopian potential to this. It’s not just
hypothetical anymore. It’s manifest in the way China is trying to deploy
exactly these kinds of ideas. China has a social score technology it is
unfolding all across the country. China has sufficient facial recognition
technology with capacity to deduct points from people who jaywalk. The
idea is you’re assigned a certain number of points and you can improve
your score or diminish it depending on the choices you make. A lot of
it seems to be targeted to some way of measuring loyalty.
M: But you still see something positive in this despite the dystopian
potential?

R: Yes. You could say such a technology is precisely about rendering
citizenship visible to people. If privacy can be protected, should I not
hold myself to account for my citizenship failures? (I am thinking a
little of Judith Butler’s (2007) Giving an Account of Oneself ). When I
jaywalk, when I fail to pick up litter … whatever I do in falling short
of some citizenship ideal should be made visible to me as much as
my bank account is or can be. … Ideally, every kind of ‘justice claim’
should somehow be registered and made visible. At least, that’s the idea.
And, as soon as we make something visible to ourselves, we transform
it into a social signal.
M: Does this not involve translating a citizen persona into a
consumer one, so to speak?

R: You had said, in a previous conversation, that there might be
some virtue to dealing with a kind of bounded rationality problem –
people cannot absorb all the signals nature might send so perhaps we
need a way of assembling into a unity what could then be disaggregated
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if people want to look at it. The price signal already does that, perhaps
in a way we don’t like. What if all the externalities we are generating,
all of our collective impact, were to be captured in some signal? Moving
beyond the price signal is tied to attempts to measure sustainability
and collective well-being – using a ‘dashboard’ of indicators – in a way
that goes beyond GDP (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009).

M: But can we separate visibility to oneself and visibility to others,
and if so how? What kind of ‘sight’ might be required or engendered
by this demand for visibility? Think of James C Scott’s (1999) Seeing
Like a State and his exposition of failures to improve the human
condition tied to this kind of sight. ... Think too, for example, of the
institutionalisation and supervision of conscience in the history of the
Church (Saada and Antaki 2018). Does the app not seek to generate
but also institutionalise a kind of conscience? Does the social score not
reflect a kind of calculable contribution to a collective salvation? Is it
possible to ‘generate’ a conscience without institutionalising it? How
so? What is the relation between the app as tied to a care of the self
(Foucault 1997) and the app as signaling subservience, subordination, a
willingness to be governed this way or to this extent? (Foucault 1990).

R: You have put some hard questions on the table. The effort to
track our impacts has obvious Foucauldian implications. It invokes not
only the image of the Panopticon but also brings to mind contemporary
Omniopticons, as I’ve put it elsewhere – that is, all of us observing all
of us. The other thing you’ve placed on the table – and perhaps tied
to thinking of the app as a form of ‘conscience’ – is the relation of
fusis and tekne. Might we embroil ourselves in a terrible contradiction
in imagining that further investment in technology will allow us to
re-align with fusis? With respect to the first issue, I am not terribly
satisfied with my response at this juncture and am somewhat overtaken
by events. I had imagined building privacy into the collection of data,
dispersing it among all users on the blockchain, and making its thirdparty use governed by those who provide it. I thought such governance
structures would legitimate this kind of collection of data. But the
challenge is enormous.
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We also need to mention the ‘Hawthorne effect’, a kind of flipside
of the Panopticon, exactly what Bentham imagined would shift the
behaviour of prisoners. The very fact of being observed changes the
way one behaves. We have built a notional ‘eye in the sky.’ An ‘eye in
the sky’ has been imagined for eons in relation to ‘virtue’ as we seek
to be virtuous in the name of God. We have always had the idea that
we will have to render our accounts to the one who sees everything
that has happened.
I am also thinking of the famous ‘Nosedive’ episode of the series
Black Mirror that everybody has been disturbed by, and that has come
up in newspaper treatments of the Chinese social score example. In
this episode, everybody is scoring everybody else and a woman watches
her score diminish to the point of being driven insane. The entire
world is divided into those who’ve opted out, and are totally socially
marginalised, and those who can literally cash in on this social capital.
People will respond to being put on display in this fashion. We have
here the dystopian dimensions of a thumodic economy. … How can we
produce a context in which the thumodic aspects of social interaction
do not generate widely dystopian effects?
M: The example of China brings us in one direction and raises
the dystopian potential of the project. However, the example may not
enable us to perfectly name misgivings about the project or articulate
well its critiques. For one thing, it does not capture the problem of
technique as one not necessarily tied to specific political arrangements.
In our conversations, we’ve identified two interesting ways to frame
the problems tied to the kinds of logics which this app harnesses
when these logics are pushed to their its limits. One is the idea that
humanity would rely on one extremely significant ‘externality’ – the
externalisation of intelligence, in the words of Michel Serres (2015:
25), in order to solve a problem of externalities, to use the economic
term. ... Another is the question of the possibility or danger of relying
on the ‘virtual’ in order to engender ‘virtue.’ Indeed, we discovered –
to our delight – that ‘virtual’ and ‘virtue’ have the same root ... and
that led us to wonder about their phenomenological (dis)connections!
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R: If I recall, the question of the externalisation of intelligence came
up in two ways. One was the question of how, specifically, to name
our current epoch or predicament. The other was about thinking more
clearly, naming better, what is going on with ‘artificial intelligence’.
M: Yes, we had been thinking about how to name our epoch or
predicament – late capitalism, neoliberalism, technique for example –
and about whether or how such things as a thumodic economy fit into
that. … What is ‘new’ exactly?

R: We can go back over time and discover various ways in which
every generation imagined itself to be at some epochal moment. How
is it we have the thumos to think of ourselves, and the Anthropocene
as being at some epochal moment?

M: It came earlier, no? … nuclear weapons, negative solidarity.
We are bound together by virtue of our ability to destroy everything.

R: There are three moments, I would say, maybe others: the
Holocaust, nuclear annihilation, and the prospect of the end of life.
This is all, I think, connected together. I am also thinking of a bit of
Žižek (2011) and also Northrop Frye (2006) – the notion that the
biblical narrative was already one that placed us in relation to some
end, some end time. This feature of the religious imagination continues
to imbue us.
M: I think too of Robert Meister’s (2006: ix-x) analysis of different
experiences of time and of end times, for example the ‘prophetic’ where
the time to change is now as opposed to the ‘messianic’ where there is
more time to be had between a first and a second coming. ... The logic
of the messianic, of buying more time, might be one of continuing to
generate externalities … because there will be time to fold back in
today’s externalities.

If the ‘end’ to be avoided is a ‘world without us,’ it might be a perfect
time for artificial intelligence to happen: an uncanny juxtaposition.
The Anthropocene leads us to imagine a world without us and where
the cell phone is tied to ‘artificial intelligence,’ to the externalisation
of our intelligence. … I was reading about the development of a device
that can ‘hear’ the words we say ‘silently.’ ‘It’s like having Siri listen to
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your internal commands’ reads the sub-title of a Popular Science article
(April 6 2018).

R: But Siri is designed not to answer certain kinds of questions
and to not form certain kinds of connections. Indeed, I read that the
designers of Siri, which was bought out by Apple, had originally built
certain functionalities into Siri that Apple later cut off because they
thought people would find it too disturbing if Siri gave answers to
certain kinds of questions. I went to a play last year at the Théatre
d’Aujourd’hui which was entitled ‘Siri’. The actress talked to Siri the
whole time on stage. She actually found ways to get Siri to engage, to
learn about Siri so she could start to gain certain indirect answers to
questions. At the end, she asked Siri to tell her everything Siri knew
about her. The play produced the bizarre sensation the playwright was
seeking: that we started to care about Siri.

I described the perhaps somewhat redemptive view that our
technology had given us the capacity to see our collective action …
and orient ourselves in relation to outcomes we were seeing coming at
us in real time or in close to real time. But you could have a different
view. Like the film Stalker, Tarkovsky’s masterpiece, where in fact
we introduce ourselves into a world that is shedding itself of us. The
externalisation of our intelligence is all that will be left once we produce
the world without us … or the transition we will have created is to
a kind of intelligence that could maintain itself in our absence. And
that’s the kind of thing that Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, Bill Gates
and others who signed what is in essence a manifesto against artificial
intelligence were foreseeing. So it’s not just the pure science fiction
ravings about the Terminator. A pretty deep critique of what I am up
to is that I am unwittingly or semi-wittingly engaged with others in
producing the grounds of the possibility of the world without us.
M: Yes. This goes back to the earlier question of how the
Anthropocene reveals us to ourselves, to borrow the words of Ferraris
regarding the cell phone. I was thinking about whether and how both
the Anthropocene and the cell phone are manifestations of technique,
of the transformation of all beings into ‘standing reserve.’ This has
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something to do with the cell phone as more a general instrument than
a tool designed for one purpose, with the cell phone as an ‘absolute
device.’ With technique, even ethical comportment – including those
who are supposed to comport themselves ethically – becomes energy
to be deployed, mapped, harnessed.

R: Michel Serres is the one who I felt helped me to understand
the significance of this universal technology. I do detect a kind of
Biblical narrative about how knowledge interacts with the destruction
of the garden of Eden. This is how or why, over the course of our
conversations, I shifted from ‘universal dispositif ’ or ‘absolute device’
to ‘externalisation of all knowledge’ in my framing of things. That is
what I’ve drawn from Serres, that we are carrying with us always at all
moments every possible understanding of all things and the way we
interact with ourselves. So, the cell phone is a further externalisation
of knowing that pursues what we already accomplished with speech
and writing and publication before.

We can think of speech as already making available to you and to
me something that I seek to articulate or express about what I know. A
logos moment. And then we can think of writing, for instance by way
of Plato’s Phaedrus, as producing distance from the direct expression
of ideas in speech. And of course, the printing press as described in
McLuhan’s Gutenberg Galaxy (2011) further extends the distance
from expression and enhances the autonomy of the text. What Serres
is saying about the smart phone is that it actually goes a step further
in placing my intelligence outside of myself. It could in fact produce a
kind of autonomy to intelligence. We speak of ‘artificial intelligence’
as if it is something like ourselves in tekne. That is the way we’ve
imagined it: something human-like placed into a dispositif which then
begins to pursue objectives of its own. This kind of fantasy is captured
in films likes Ex Machina or Her. But I think that overly personifies
or anthropomorphises the artificial intelligence we are in the midst of
creating. Machine learning algorithms, it seems to me, come closer to
being like the artificial intelligence already imagined by Adam Smith
(1761, 1776) when he wrote of an invisible hand that was able to orient
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human beings collectively toward rational outcomes exceeding their
own individual intelligence. There is a sense in which it is our collective
intelligence that is augmented through the machine learning algorithms
we are beginning to deploy. After all, these algorithms are ‘trained’
by us to pursue outcomes that we seek. There is a light film starring
Johnny Depp, Transcendence, in which he – his intelligence – in essence
gets uploaded into some form of digital universe. It has produced its
own capacity to interact with all things. That’s closer to the artificial
intelligence we are creating now at the moment where everything
derived from our own intelligence is extended into tekne and producing
a form of autonomy from us. The driverless car exhibits this property.

You’ve raised the question of what it means to align the
externalisation of our intelligence with the laws of the earth. I felt
naively that there was something salutary and propitious to the fact
that this universal dispositif emerged at the same moment that we could
render visible everything that we could destroy. It put us back in the
Garden of Eden so to speak. Now that you’ve eaten from this tree of
knowledge or intelligence, what will you do with what you have taken?
M: And what happens to the ‘virtue’ you are interested in fostering
with the externalisation of our intelligence? Or to modify the question
and transform it into a different one: (how) can the virtual teach virtue?
R: What do we mean by the ‘virtual’ anyhow?

M: Is the virtual something that is not actualised but actualisable:
is it a fitness or in that sense a virtue, basically?
R: The one transition in the etymology that I found interesting is
to be ‘virtually broke,’ which suggests that you are all but broke but
not quite broke.

M: This is like Aristotle discussing the Megarian School position
in the Metaphysics where he introduces the idea of a potentiality. For
the Megarians, when a cat is jumping, say, it can jump, but when it is
not it cannot. However, when the cat is about to pounce, that would
be the virtual. It is virtually jumping because it has that capacity, but
it is not yet actualising it.
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R: Right, when it’s crouching and is about to pounce it has
virtually pounced. The total concentration of potentiality just before its
actualisation, as if you were winding a spring, and you know that when
it releases it will uncoil. It has become taut and virtually sprung and
that potentiality can be stored. So how would that idea of the stored,
accentuated, unrealised potentiality as ‘virtual’ relate to virtual reality?

M: In effect, how did the computer scientists take over this world?

R: I see a step taken first as regards the use of memory in the
computer. When it uses real memory, the computer’s operating system
stores data in a physical address. When it uses virtual memory, it puts
it in a virtual address on the hard drive, from which it can be assigned
to real memory. Virtual memory is both potentially real memory and
a way of emulating real memory on another device.

M: As regards a virtual reality, what is interesting there is the
presence of the term ‘reality’ as well. The phrase ‘virtual reality’ seems to
be an oxymoron. However, I believe the connection is that virtual reality
has everything but this tiny little slice of the real. But as we augment
virtual reality, our perception of it and the sensations it can produce
in us come closer and closer to resembling the so-called real world.
R: That’s really interesting. What this would mean is that the
computerised, digital world has succeeded in stocking up potential.
What it has sliced off is the layer of actualisation. It allows us to inhabit
potential in its entirety. When you think of it in that way it’s true that
these virtual worlds have the bizarre quality to them that you can jump
anywhere or you can come back to life; there’s never the reckoning of
actualisation. Everything still remains possible. So, if you thought of it
as pure potentiality or pure possibility, that would be a virtual reality.
M: I was wondering to what degree the idea of potentiality had been
lost. Do you keep the idea of potentiality if the virtual emulates the real?

R: Well there is another theme embedded here that we haven’t
touched upon so much. We called it the thumodic, the sense that one
would be exposed to public censure or shame, but there is also the sense
of play. Virtual reality seems to connect to the ludic. I have re-read
Huizinga’s (1971) Homo Ludens. I have also been quite influenced by
108

Is Technology for the Anthropocene an Impossibility?
A Conversation about the Myko Project

Brian Massumi’s (2014) What Animals Teach Us about Politics. Massumi
focuses a great deal upon play. His figure is that of the animals that
play-flight. They nip but they don’t bite. The nip is a kind of potential
biting and they’re acting out all of the possibility of violence, but they
are doing that playfully, without actualisation.
M: But we can do that too, without virtual reality.

R: Yes, but although Massumi does not write about this, there is
something about virtual reality that is the reality of play or a reality
that would always have the feature of play to it because it would never
translate itself, to be Heideggerian for a moment, into a being-untodeath. Your avatar is something that in principle never perishes. You
can lose at a game but you just start over.
M: But I think I want to resist that … because the nip has a
proximity to the bite that the so-called virtual doesn’t have. If two
kids are play-fighting, they could punch a bit harder and are pulling
punches. There is always a sense of pulling back and also of attunement,
of attunement one to the other. In the play in virtual reality, there is
no necessary sense of pulling back. It’s as if one can unleash violence,
potentially kill thousands of people. There is no nipping there. What
I’m curious about is what fantasies or unconscious drives the virtual
allows people to explore in a way that is different from the nipping
form of play?
R: What you are saying is really well taken. There is a proximity
between the nip and what it could become. The potentiality is standing
in relation to an actualisation. If you were to sever the potentiality from
the actualisation, and it were always only a nip, perhaps you could
construct a world entirely of that sort. Call it Westworld, where basically
even if you unleashed yourself fully that would never translate itself
into all of the slaughter that your senses were experiencing. That may
be one of the problems with virtual reality and where its relationship to
virtue starts to break down. Is there something about virtue that gave
to the name virtual precisely something that stood in relation to the
actual in the sense of exercising manhood or displaying the behaviour
or capacity that in its potential prepared for the actual? I just learned of
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the training in virtue of the Maasai warriors whose potential to defend
the community and its herd of animals is only celebrated once they
have killed a lion. In this sense, for there to be virtue in the virtual, it
trades upon its eventual actualisation. Now, however, in virtual reality,
virtue has become so utterly detached from its actualization that there
is a kind of gap or breach introduced into the display of virtue. This
may be a feature of contemporary discourse insofar as people engaging
on social media sense themselves to be in a virtual space rather than
a public forum or agora of some kind, where the actual implications
of anger, fear and humiliation are directly lived out. I think there is
something about the complete storage of potentiality unrelated to
actualisation that is very significant for our capacity to be virtuous.
There may also be contexts in which living with the actualisation of the
virtual accentuates rather than numbs our disorientation. Apparently
the American pilots of drones face equal or perhaps even greater posttraumatic stress disorder engaging in what can feel like virtual combat
as they confront the actualisation of the attacks they have unleashed
on civilians (Telegraph 2015).

M: A few things come to mind in what you are saying. One
concerns the virtual as a ‘replacement for’ the metaphysical or other
world. Perhaps we are living in end times and thus there is a looming
relationship to the afterlife. Does the virtual produce anything
significant in relationship to that situation? Is it where I seek salvation?
This world is not good enough for me; I am miserable or bored, so I
go into the virtual where there is redemption and salvation and I can
find my better self. So that is one potentiality.
R: Well I am not a gamer but so often it seems to be the opposite:
let’s plunge further into the dystopian, because that way we can
accustom and inure ourselves to that experience without actually
having it.

M: Well that could also be ressentiment, like the weak find the
pleasure of being the strong in that place where you don’t have to face
death for real. I don’t know exactly how Massumi treats this, but the
thing about nipping is that it is play fighting with another real animal.
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There is a social dimension there. Do I need there to be other human
beings playing in the virtual world? Does that matter or not? All kinds
of bots and avatars populate the virtual world. Does it matter whether
there are real others and whether the virtual world is shared? We are
here exploring how ‘being-with’ – something completely bound up with
how we usually think of ‘virtue’ – is or can be declined.

R: Well, the film Ready Player One engages with all of this because
it sets up the reversal of the relationship between the virtual and the
real. It draws on the premise that after a dystopian collapse of the world
into slum conditions, the most significant economic activity is play in
a virtual world. The largest company has become one that makes the
games for this world. Everyone is connected virtually to these games
and plays almost continuously. When people enter the world they can
play in, what’s at stake is the commercial control over the actual entities
that sell them the virtual world. You can imagine how the film might
structure this: a kind of back and forth between the virtual and the real,
between entering into the game and leaving it to try to control it and
then re-entering it to do the same. There’s a kind of seamless movement
back and forth. At one point, though, the people who are playing and
have met only as avatars meet in the real world and turn out to be very
different from their personae. Thus, for example, a great warrior almost
inevitably turns out to be an eleven-year-old. What drives the drama
of it is that it is very difficult for people to tell whether they are in the
material or virtual world and in the end the two become indissociable.

M: What is the relationship between what you are doing with
your app and this virtual world? I suppose you were believing – or
hoping to discover – that there can be a so-called healthy relationship
between the virtual and the real. Perhaps my avatar can teach me to
re-connect with the world. Perhaps there is a promise in virtuality
just like Lynn Hunt (2008) has argued that epistolary novels taught
people about human rights and empathy. When there is a new medium
or technology, whether it be the epistolary novel or something else, it
becomes a pedagogical tool. Is the question one of its deployment and
of its tendency towards worldliness or worldlessness? That seems to
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be the connection. Your task or challenge would be: ‘how do I get the
app to align well so that it and the score relate you back to reality?’ It’s
not a score about how many people I’ve killed or how many treasures
I’ve collected. It’s meant to be a total reflection of my situatedness in
the world, so it should throw me back into the world. It’s a virtual that
cannot absorb the real but rather can become absorbed by the real. Is
that possible and is it in the very nature of virtuality to hold out such
a promise?

R: Yes, that’s exactly where the connection is. We haven’t touched
upon this so far but to the extent that it was gamified, it was designed
to get people involved and engaged with it.
M: If you are still Richard on the app, is it gamified? Facebook is
not gamified, is it? You’re still who you are. There’s no avatar, is there?
If you have a fake name and your appearance is dissembled, that seems
like a different thing than if it's Facebook and you have real pictures
and you are sharing your life. Or is it identical? What is the difference?

R: It’s a little bit of a tangent but I think that Facebook still gives
people the occasion to curate themselves and so what they present
about themselves and how they seek to appear is different perhaps from
who they are and more about how they could be or want to appear. It
works in both directions, though, because circumstances arise in which
people are confronted in their real workplaces with the representations
of themselves that they are making online. So, they get themselves in
trouble for trying to appear to be exotic creatures on Facebook, which
then seems to be out of line with the way they are trying to appear in
the workplace.
M: This makes me think of Goffman’s (1959) presentation of self
in everyday life and its adaption into an online or networked world.
It also makes me wonder about how ‘personality’ or ‘legal personality’
might need to be re-thought. ...
R: Where the project was trying to exploit this, and I use the term
advisedly, was how we thought that there could be a kind of virtuous
back and forth between the virtual and real worlds. It is odd now to
confront the etymology of ‘world’; I hadn’t seen that it has already an
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anthropocentric quality to it, coming from the Old English wer which
is a Germanised version of vir and so it already has that sense of ‘man’
in it. The simple idea for our project was that we wanted everyone
to have their own world, and to be able to see how their behaviour
changed their world.
M: And so … ‘world’ brings us back to ‘virtue’ as well!

Notes
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Thumos is part of the tri-partite division of the soul found in the Republic, the
other parts being epithumia and logos. Thumos is etymologically related to
epithumia.
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